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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
Tort Law
I. LANDLORD CANNOT AvoID LIABILITY
WHERE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR NEGLIGENT
In Durkin v. Hansen' the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed
whether a landlord's liability for personal injuries sustained by a tenant extends
to negligent acts committed by an independent contractor hired by that
landlord.2 The court determined that the landlord owed a duty of reasonable
care to the tenant and could not avoid liability by hiring an independent
contractor to perform the work.3 However, the court concluded that a jury
issue existed as to whether the landlord breached this duty. Therefore, the
court reversed the earlier summary judgment award for the defendants and
remanded.' This decision extends the scope of landlord liability in South
Carolina.
The defendants, Kevin and Denise Hansen, owned a condominium in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The Hansens authorized Sea Breeze Property
Management and Contract Services, Inc. (Sea Breeze) to handle the rental and
upkeep of their unit. The plaintiff, Bernadette Durkin, rented the Hansen unit
beginning in January 1990. Sea Breeze contracted with Rainbow International
Carpet (Rainbow) to clean the carpets in the units, including those in the
Hansen's unit. Durkin did not request this cleaning nor did she complain
about the carpets' condition. Sea Breeze asked Durkin to remain out of the
unit for two to two-and-one-half hours during the cleaning. On the cleaning
day, Durkin left the unit for four hours. After returning, Durkin entered the
kitchen where she slipped on a soapy substance and fell, sustaining injuries.5
The court began its analysis with the principle that a landlord who
undertakes to repair or improve the premises must exercise reasonable care
and is liable for the injuries caused by the landlord's own negligence or by the
negligence of the landlord's servants and employees.6 Thus, a jury issue of
1. __ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 552.
3. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 553 (citing Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., 14 S.E.2d 489 (N.C.
1941); Strayer v. Lindeman, 427 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio 1981)).
4. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 551-52.
5. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d 551-52.
6. See Durkin, __ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 552 (citing Conner v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963)).
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liability would have existed if the Hansens, Sea Breeze, or their direct
employees cleaned the carpets. 7
In Durkin the South Carolina Court of Appeals was faced with an issue
of first impression. The benchmark South Carolina case dealing with the tort
liability of property owners is Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp.8
In Timmons the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a court can hold a
landlord or property owner liable for breach of contract when the owner fails
to comply with an express agreement to repair. However, that remedy is
limited to contractual damages and does not include recovery for personal
injuries.9 After Timmons, in Conner the supreme court extended liability to
include tort liability where the landlord made negligent repairs or improve-
ments." Relying on the majority rule at that time, the court reasoned that
the landlord owes a duty to the tenant to exercise reasonable care in perform-
ing repairs or improvements and that a breach of this duty gives rise to
liability for any personal injury caused by such breach." In Durkin the court
of appeals further extended a landlord's tort liability, encompassing acts of
negligence committed by an independent contractor. 12
The general rule is that an owner or landlord is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor;1 3 however, a host of exceptions to
this rule exist. 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized an
7. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 552.
8. 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932).
9. Id. at 369-70, 162 S.E. at 332. In dicta the court
indicated that recovery for personal injury may be possible under certain exceptions, one being
"where the lessor actually undertakes to make the needed repairs and negligently does so--where
there is misfeasance as distinguished from nonfeasance." Id. at 374, 162 S.E.2d at 333-34.
10. Conner, 243 S.C. at 139-40, 132 S.E.2d at 388-89.
11. Id. at 140, 132 S.E.2d at 388-89 (quoting 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 678
(1941)). In 1989, the Court of Appeals faced again the issue of a landlord's tort liability, this
time under the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, (SCLRTA) S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Law. Co-op. 1991). See Watson v. Sellers, 299 S.C. 426, 385 S.E.2d 369
(Ct. App. 1989). In Watson the court held that the SCRLTA expressly creates a cause of action
for recovery of tort damages when a landlord fails to do whatever is reasonably necessary to keep
the premises in a habitable condition. Id. at 433, 385 S.E.2d at 373.
12. Durkin, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 533.
13. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting Conlin v. City Council, 49 S.C.L. (14
Rich.) 201 (1868)) (citing Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236, 329
S.E.2d 426 (1985)).
14. Widely recognized exceptions to this general rule mandating a factual decision as to the
landlord's liability include situations where the owner employs an incompetent independent
contractor, Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, 217 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Ark. 1949), where the owner
retains some control over the work being done, Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 143
P.2d 929, 930-31 (Cal. 1943), where contract binds the owner to perform the work, Vitale v.
Duerbeck, 62 S.W.2d 559, 560-61 (Mo. 1933) (per curiam), or where statute binds the owner
to perform the work, Strayer v. Lindeman, 427 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ohio 1981). See also 49 AM.
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exception to the general rule where the independent contractor performs
inherently dangerous work. " Another exception, relied upon by the Durkin
court, is that an owner who delegates an absolute duty to an independent
contractor remains liable as if the independent contractor were the owner's
employee. 16
Thus, the general rule is not absolute; exceptions develop when
circumstances, justice, and logic dictate. In light of the facts in Durkin, the
court of appeals properly created an exception to the general rule. The
reasoning behind this rule is sound: Where a landlord owes an absolute duty
to a tenant, that duty is not met by delegating the work to a third party, but
is met only by inspecting and taking other reasonable action to ensure that the
premises and the repairs are safe. The determinative question was, therefore,
whether the Hansens and Sea Breeze owed an absolute duty to Durkin.
The court determined that the Hansens and Sea Breeze owed an absolute
duty to Durkin. First, the contract between the Hansens and Sea Breeze
authorized Sea Breeze to maintain the condominium. 7 Second, the South
Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (SCRLTA) imposes specific
duties on a landlord." s Further, a landlord who makes repairs or improve-
ments owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenant, and the landlord cannot
avoid this duty by hiring an independent contractor.n '
The finding of an absolute duty in Durkin is a bit conclusory. In essence,
the court stated that the Hansens and Sea Breeze owed an absolute duty to
Durkin, that they could not avoid this duty by delegating it to an independent
contractor, and that, therefore, the Hansens and Sea Breeze still owed a duty
to Durkin. This logic assumes the existence of the so-called absolute duty, but
JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 874 (1970) (stating that because a variety of considerations
determine a landlord's duty with regard to an independent contractor's work, it is difficult to
construct a general rule).
15. Young, 285 S.C. at 242, 329 S.E.2d at 429 (recognizing the existence of the exception,
but finding it inapplicable).
16. See Durkin, - S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 552-53 (citing 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant
§ 591 (1948)); see also 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 875 (1970) (discussing a
landlord's liability for repairs or improvements done by an independent contractor).
17. Durkin, - S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 553. The contract authorized Sea Breeze "to
enter the condominium unit for 'inspections, to perform routine maintenance, and to effect such
repair work as may be necessary, in the sole discretion of Agent, to keep the unit suitable for
rent.'" Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 553.
18. Id. at 437 S.E.2d at 553. The court relied on section 27-40-440 of the SCSCRLTA,
which provides: "A landlord shall ... make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary
to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition ... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-
440(a) (2) (Law. Co-op. 1991); see Durkin, _ S.C. at __ n.3, 437 S.E.2d at 553 n.3.
19. Durkin, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 553 (citing Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., 14
S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1941); Strayer, 427 N.E.2d at 781; see also Hill v. McDonald, 442 A.2d 133,
135-36 (D.C. 1982) (recognizing that a landlord can be held vicariously liable for the negligence
of the landlord's independent contractor).
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neither the contract nor the SCRLTA actually imposed an absolute duty on
either the Hansens or Sea Breeze to clean the unit's carpets. The contract did
not specifically state that the carpets had to be cleaned periodically;'
likewise, the SCRLTA hardly requires landlords to frequently clean carpets for
a rental unit to remain habitable.21 These sources may have authorized the
Hansens and Sea Breeze to clean the carpets, but neither source affirmatively
placed an absolute duty on the landlords to do so. If Durkin complained about
the unit's condition, then the contract might impose on Sea Breeze a duty to
act because the contract specifically required Sea Breeze to do whatever was
necessary to maintain the unit.' Similarly, had the condition of the carpets
made the unit uninhabitable, then the SCRLTA would place on the landlord
a duty to act.' The court simply found that an absolute duty existed by
virtue of the contract and the SCRLTA without further discussing how the
court reached this conclusion. However, reliance on the contract and the
SCRLTA to find an absolute duty was unnecessary. The mere undertaking of
repairs or improvements itself created a duty of reasonable care upon which
liability could rest.
In Livingston v. Essex Investment Co.,24 the North Carolina Supreme
Court quoted the Supreme Court of Nebraska:
Conceding that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the
parties to this action, we think it is clear that the landlord is not relieved
of liability for injury to his tenant by the fact that he employed an
independent contractor to perform the work .... So long as the relation
of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, the landlord owed a
duty to the defendant not to do, or cause to be done, anything which would
render the premises dangerous and unsafe for his tenant.2
Using Livingston's logic, the Hansens and Sea Breeze created a duty of
reasonable care for themselves when they undertook to clean the carpets in the
condominium. Finding such a duty when the landlord undertakes repairs is
well-supported by the case law in other jurisdictions.26
20. While arguably the contract imposed a duty upon Sea Breeze because the contract
expressly stated that Sea Breeze was "to perform routine maintenance," the contract simply
authorized Sea Breeze to take such action and did not require or mandate that action. See
Durkin, - S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 553.
21. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (imposing a duty upon landlords
to "maintain premises").
22. See Durkin, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 552-53.
23. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(a) (2) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
24. 14 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1941).
25. Id. at 493 (quoting Doyle v. Franek, 118 N.W. 468, 469 (Neb. 1908) (per curiam)).
26. See, e.g., Bailey v. Zlotnick, 149 F.2d 505, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Arlington Realty Co.
v. Lawson, 153 So. 425, 426-27 (Ala. 1934); Frazier v. Edwards, 190 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1948).
1994]
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Furthermore, South Carolina law supports finding the duty. In Conner the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that a landlord assumed a duty of
reasonable care when the landlord undertook repairs or improvements. 7 In
addition, in Watson v. Sellers28 the court of appeals held that a landlord must
keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition and that the tenant can
recover tort damages for a breach of this duty.29 Thus, the law in South
Carolina has followed the majority rule in other jurisdictions in finding that a
duty of reasonable care binds the landlord when the landlord undertakes
repairs or improvements. The court correctly determined that the Hansens and
Sea Breeze owed a duty of reasonable care to Durkin because they undertook
to clean the carpets.
Upon finding that the Hansens and Sea Breeze assumed a duty, the court
then found that the defendants could not delegate this duty. Thus, the landlord
would remain liable for breach of this duty whether the landlord or an
independent contractor whom the landlord employs actually performs the
negligent work.3" Relying on Hill v. McDonald," the court concluded that
a landlord owes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care not to create unsafe
conditions when the landlord undertakes repairs or improvements. Thus, the
landlord is vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contrac-
tor.32 This seems to be the true source of liability in this case. Sea Breeze
certainly assumed a duty of reasonable care when it endeavored to clean the
carpets. In finding that Sea Breeze cannot delegate such a duty to an
independent contractor, the court correctly concluded that the landlord still
owed a duty to Durkin and could be held liable for breach. Therefore, the
court did not need to focus on the contract and the SCRLTA as sources of an
absolute duty; the duty that the Hansens and Sea Breeze took upon themselves
when they undertook to make improvements was enough to find a jury issue
of liability.
The court's ultimate conclusion is correct and well supported by the vast
majority of law throughout other jurisdictions. In their hornbook on the law
of torts, Prosser and Keeton state that "[w]hen the lessor entrusts the repairs
to an independent contractor, the general weight of authority is that his duty
of care in making them cannot be delegated, and he will be liable for the
contractor's negligence. "I The Restatement (Second) of Torts and the
27. Conner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 140, at 140, 132 S.E.2d 385, 389
(1963).
28. 299 S.C. 426, 385 S.E.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989).
29. Id. at 433-37, 385 S.E.2d at 373-75.
30. See Durkin v. Hansen, _ S.C. __, __, 437 S.E.2d 550, 552-53 (Ct. App. 1993).
31. 442 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1982).
32. Durkin, __ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 553 (citing Hill, 442 A.2d at 133).
33. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 445
(5th ed. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (1977)).
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Restatement (Second) of Property agree that a landlord who employs an
independent contractor to perform work that the landlord undertakes
gratuitously is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the contractor's
negligence as if the contractor's conduct was the landlord's conduct.3 4 In
fact, the reporter's note to section 19.3 of the Restatement (Second) of
Property states:
While it is sometimes stated that the authority in this area of the law is
confused, the confusion is more apparent than real. Nearly all jurisdic-
tions have held, on one theory or another, that the landlord may be liable
where he has used an independent contractor to make repairs even though
the repairs were gratuitous.35
The courts generally agree that when a landlord undertakes repairs or
improvements, the landlord is liable for the negligence of the independent
contractor just as if the landlord committed the negligence. 3' The court's
ultimate conclusion, to extend a landlord's liability to include negligent acts
committed by independent contractors, places South Carolina within that view.
In reaching its decision, the court did not distinguish the "collateral
negligence" theory. Carpet cleaning does not involve inherent danger. In
May v. 11 1/2 East 49th Street Co., 37 the New York Court of Appeals held
that where the work being performed was not intrinsically dangerous and
where the only negligence was in the actual performance of the work,
collateral negligence existed, and the landlord could not be held liable.38 The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY also states that the landlord "is not
liable for the collateral negligence of an independent contractor hired by him
to make gratuitous repairs which do not affect the quality of the job when
completed. "39
This brings us full circle: Normally there must be some absolute duty
imposed upon the landlord for the landlord to remain responsible for an
independent contractor's negligence. Absent an absolute, nondelegable duty,
the landlord's duty properly would extinguish after reasonably hiring a
competent independent contractor. Any negligence committed by the
independent contractor then would be collateral negligence and not the
landlord's responsibility. Thus, the court had to find some absolute or
nondelegable duty to avoid this rule. Although neither the contract between
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 420 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 19.3 (1977).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 19.3 reporter's note 4 (1977).
36. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 875 (1970).
37. 54 N.Y.S.2d 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945), aff'd, 68 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1946).
38. Id. at 866.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 19.3 cmt. c (1977).
1994]
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the Hansens and Sea Breeze nor the SCRLTA placed on Sea Breeze an
absolute duty to clean the carpets, the court found a nondelegable duty of
reasonable care arose when Sea Breeze undertook to clean the carpets. The
general rule is that where there is collateral negligence of an independent
contractor and where the landlord has failed to meet some other duty the
landlord will remain liable for his breach of this other duty." Thus, the
collateral negligence rule likely would have little effect on the outcome of this
case even had the court considered it.
The court reached the correct and equitable conclusion in Durldn.
Although the court found an absolute duty existed without explaining the basis
of such a finding and although the court failed to analyze the collateral
negligence rule, the court enunciated a well-reasoned and well-supported
ruling.
Johnnie W. Baxley, III
II. DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR REASONABLE RELIANCE
In Nine v. Henderson' the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
granting of summary judgment for the defendant seller in a fraud action by a
home purchaser for the seller's failure to disclose the extent of known termite
damage. The majority held that Nine, the purchaser, could not reasonably
have relied on the representations of Henderson, the seller, because Henderson
provided termite inspection reports at the closing recommending that a
building inspector be consulted to determine if any structural damage to the
property existed. Also, Nine discovered additional termite damage to the
property.' The dissent argued that summary judgment was inappropriate,
stating that it was unable to "conclude as a matter of law that Nine failed to
exercise reasonable diligence under the circumstances." 3  The majority
opinion raises doctrinal questions concerning the diligence standard to which
courts will hold a plaintiff in a fraud case.
In August 1987 Henderson and Nine executed a contract for the sale of
Henderson's residential property. Three structures stood on the property - a
main house, a cottage, and a garage.' In May 1987, before putting the
property on the market, Henderson employed Terminix to inspect the
structures for termite infestation. 5 Although the sales contract incorporated
by reference the May wood infestation reports, Henderson never offered these
40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 19.3 cmt. c (1977).
1. __ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 184.
3. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 188 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 183.
5. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 185 (Cureton, ., dissenting).
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reports to Nine during the negotiations and only disclosed infestation damage
to the house's eaves and to the garage's window sills and doors. The May
infestation reports revealed additional undisclosed damage.'
Nine rented and occupied the house for two weeks before the closing,
during which Nine repaired the disclosed termite damage, as well as additional
damage he discovered.' After the parties signed the sales contract, Henderson
had Terminix perform another inspection. Prepared by Terminix, the wood
infestation reports detailed extensive visible termite damage and warned of
probable hidden damage to the structures.' The reports counseled the owner
"'to call a qualified. . . expert in the building trade to ascertain their [sic]
opinion as to whether there is structural damage to this property.'" '
Henderson provided the reports to Nine and Nine's attorney at the closing.
Nine closed despite the reports' cautionary language and despite his discovery
of undisclosed termite damage while making the repairs.10 At trial Nine
testified that the total repair cost would be $43,000. "
Nine fied an action for breach of warranty and fraud, claiming that by
withholding the May 1987 wood infestation reports Henderson failed to
disclose the full extent of termite damage known to Henderson.' 2  On
Henderson's summary judgment motion, the trial court held that Nine could
not reasonably have relied on Henderson's representations concerning the
degree of infestation because the August termite inspection reports warned of
prior infestation and advised Nine to consult an expert to assess possible
structural damage.'3 Nine appealed.' 4
Relying principally on Bostick v. Orkin Exterminating Co., the majority
found that Nine could not reasonably have relied on Henderson's representa-
tions. 6 In Bostick the home purchaser sued a professional exterminating
company for fraud in the preparation of a wood infestation report.17 On the
face of the report, the defendant gave favorable responses opining that
insufficient visible damage existed to warrant repair. However, the report
6. Nine, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 183.
7. Id. at , 437 S.E.Zd at 183. A provision in the contract for sale required Henderson to
pay Nine $200 for the labor and materials expended in making the repairs. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d
at 183.
8. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 183-84.
9. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 184 (quoting the infestation reports).
10. Nine, __ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 183-84.
11. Id. at n.4, 437 S.E.2d at 185 n.4 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 183; id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 185 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 184.
14. Nine, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 183.
15. 806 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1986).
16. See Nine, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 184.
17. Bostick, 806 F.2d at 505.
19941
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noted that the property previously was treated for wood decay fungus,
termites, and powder post beetles." The back page of the report stated that
if evidence of active or past infestation existed, "'it must be assumed that there
is some damage to the building caused by this infestation.'"19 The report
recommended that a qualified expert in the building trade be consulted to
determine the existence of structural damage.20  The court found that
"Bostick's reliance on the answers on the face of the form was unjustified,"
noting, "One claiming fraud in South Carolina must 'exercise reasonable
diligence and prudence under the circumstances. '"21 The court stated
specifically that "Bostick's failure to comply with the simple warnings and
recommendations indicated in the Report ... was not reasonable diligence and
prudence under the circumstances."'
Analogizing Bostick, the majority stated that "Nine... had no reasonable
right to rely on Henderson's representations."'* The majority found
determinative that Nine was aware of the termite problems from the beginning,
that Nine discovered additional termite problems himself, and that Nine elected
to close despite this knowledge and despite the warnings on the termite
reports. 21 In summary the majority thought that "Nine's own actions placed
him in the predicament in which he now finds himself. "5
The majority cited Watts v. Monarch Builders26 and Aaron v. Hampton
Motors27 to support the proposition that a plaintiffs lack of diligence is a
proper basis for denying relief.2" In Watts the purchasers of residential
property sued the seller for fraud, alleging that the seller misrepresented the
property lines.29 While visiting the lot, from a distance the seller pointed out
the property lines. The purchasers never asked to walk the boundaries and
ignored other opportunities to learn the lot's exact size.30 Denying relief, the
18. Id.
19. Id. at 509 (quoting the wood infestation report).
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Florentine Corp. v. PEDA I, Inc., 287 S.C. 382, 386, 339 S.E.2d 112, 114
(1985)).
22. Bostick, 806 F.2d at 509.
23. Nine v. Henderson, __ S.C. -, -, 437 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ct. App. 1993).
24. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 184.
25. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 184. (citing Watts v. Monarch Builders, 272 S.C. 517, 252
S.E.2d 889 (1979); Aaron v. Hampton Motors, 240 S.C. 26, 124 S.E.2d 585 (1962)).
26. 272 S.C. at 517, 252 S.E.2d at 889.
27. 240 S.C. at 26, 124 S.E.2d at 585.
28. Nine, __ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 184.
29. Watts, 272 S.C. at 517, 519, 252 S.E.2d at 890.
30. Id. at 518, 252 S.E.2d at 890.
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court stated, "This is not a case of fraudulent misrepresentation. This is a case
where two purchasers chose to shut their eyes."31
In Aaron a used car purchaser sued the seller in fraud for misrepresenta-
tions concerning the car's condition and mileage. 32 Although finding for the
plaintiff, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated the rule that "one will not
be heard to say that he was deceived by a vendor's misrepresentations if, by
his own negligent failure to avail himself of information easily within his
reach, he has contributed to the perpetration of the alleged fraud."33 In Nine
the majority thought sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's
conclusion that Nine "had no reasonable right to rely on Henderson's
representations." Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of
Henderson's summary judgment motion.3"
In contrast, the dissent could not "conclude as a matter of law that Nine
failed to exercise reasonable diligence under the circumstances of this case in
relying upon representations regarding the extent of termite damage, despite
his knowledge of previous termite infestations and the cautionary language of
the August [wood infestation] report."" The dissent cited May v. Hopkin-
son36 for the proposition that a home purchaser "has a right to rely on the
seller to disclose latent or hidden defects which are not discoverable by
reasonable examination and of which the seller has knowledge."37 The
dissent continued by noting, "South Carolina law provides that insect
infestation may be a latent defect in property, giving rise to a duty to disclose
on the part of the seller."3" Although claiming that the recipient of fraudu-
lent information can rely on the statements even if further investigation may
31. Id. at 519, 252 S.E.2d at 891.
32. Aaron, 240 S.C. at 29, 124 S.E.2d at 586.
33. Id. at 34, 124 S.E.2d at 589 (quoting Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5
(1959)).
34. Nine v. Henderson, _ S.C. _, __,437 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ct. App. 1993).
35. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 188 (Cureton, J., dissenting). Henderson offered two further
defenses rejected by the dissent. First, Henderson claimed that "the 'as is' provision of the
contract of sale gave Nine notice that Henderson had made no representations as to the condition
of the property." Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 186 (Cureton, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted
that an as is provision does not bar recovery in fraud. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187
(Cureton, J., dissenting) (citing MacFarlane v. Manly, 274 S.C. 392, 264 S.E.2d 838 (1980)).
Second, Henderson alleged that "by assuming responsibility to repair all damage to the property,
Nine assumed responsibility for determining the extent of damage." Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at
186 (Cureton, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed, noting, "The record does not reflect that
Nine agreed to assume responsibility for discovering and repairing all damage to the properties
regardless of the extent of damage." Nine, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J.,
dissenting).
36. 289 S.C. 549, 347 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1986).
37. Nine, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting) (citing Cohen v. Blessing, 259
S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972)).
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expose the fraud,39 the dissent conceded that one alleging fraud "must
exercise reasonable diligence under the circumstances" to satisfy the
requirement for justifiable reliance.40
The dissent distinguished Bostick, which concerned the reasonability of
a purchaser's reliance on alleged misrepresentations made in an infestation
report where the purchaser ignored the report's warnings to consult a building
expert. 41 The dissent stated, "Whether or not exculpatory statements made
by a third party should defeat Nine's right to rely presents a different issue
than was involved in Bostick."42 Believing that a reasonable juror could find
that Nine exercised reasonable diligence, the dissent remained unconvinced
that "the law would require Nine to discover the significance of the language
in the reports concerning possible hidden termite damage, delay the closing
and go out and hire an engineer to inspect the properties."" 3 Viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Nine, the dissent believed that the record
provided sufficient evidence to imply that Henderson was aware of extensive
termite damage, that Henderson failed to disclose this knowledge to Nine, that
Henderson made positive representations that if Nine made certain minor
repairs, the properties would receive a clean bill of health from the termite
inspector, and that Henderson rushed the closing where he provided Nine with
the August infestation reports."
In conclusion the dissent found the issue of Nine's right to rely inappro-
priate for disposition by summary judgment.45 Quoting Unlimited Services
v. Macklen Enterprises,46 the dissent stated, "'Issues of reliance and its
reasonableness, going as they do to subjective states of mind and applications
of objective standards of reasonableness, are preeminently factual issues for
the trier of facts.'" 47
Nine presented a difficult decision for the court. Construing the evidence
in a light most favorable to Nine, as the court must on a summary judgment
motion,48 the court could infer that Henderson did not disclose the full extent
39. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting) (citing Reid v. Harbison Dev.
Corp., 285 S.C. 557, 330 S.E.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 289 S.C. 319, 345 S.E.2d 492 (1986)).
. 40. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting) (citing Bostick v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 806 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1986)).
41. See Bostick, 806 F.2d at 508-09.
42. Nine, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
,44. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting). The dissent also found it
unfair to hold Nine to a higher standard of diligence than the Terminix professionals, who were
unable to detect the termite damage. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 188 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
46. 303 S.C. 384, 387, 401 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1991).
47. Nine, - S.C. at-, 437 S.E.2d at 188 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
48. See Byers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., _ S.C. _, _, 425 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1992)
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of known termite damage.49 At a minimum, the court could infer that
Henderson did not notify Nine of the need to contact an expert to determine
the scope of the infestation." Then the court had to consider Nine's duty to
exercise reasonable diligence under the circumstances.51
In making this analysis,52 the court must weigh two policies: "on the one
hand, to suppress fraud, and on the other, not to encourage negligence and
inattention to one's own interest. " " Because a fraud perpetrator is a
wrongdoer, courts generally have required conduct greater than negligence to
bar the defrauded plaintiff from recovery.5" Otherwise, the perpetrator of
fraud would escape with impunity because of the victim's carelessness. In
J.B. Colt Co. v. Brie' the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the rule
that only "reckless or conscious disregard of [their] duty" will deprive victims
of their right to rely.56 Additionally, the court stated that "mere negligence
or inadvertent failure to exercise due care, when such failure is induced by a
(citing SSI Medical Serv. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 392 S.E.2d 789 (1990)).
49. The dissent found that Henderson positively represented "that if certain minor repairs were
accomplished, the house would receive a 'clean bill of health' from Terminix." Nine, _ S.C.
at _, 437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting). Additionally, Henderson admitted that he
did not reveal the May graphs to Nine and agreed that "prior to closing he only informed Nine
of the repairs noted by Nine." Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 185 (Cureton, J., dissenting). In his
deposition Henderson testified that he "didn't see any reason to [show Nine the May inspection
graphs prior to closing]. It's like if I sell a used car, do I need to show the man how much I
originally paid for the car, or the contracts?" Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 185 (Cureton, J.,
dissenting). (alteration in original).
50. In South Carolina the buyer has a right to rely on a home seller to disclose latent insect
infestation known to the seller and not discoverable on a reasonable examination of the property.
See May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 557, 347 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Cohen
v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972)).
51. Bostick v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 806 F.2d 504, 509 (4th'Cir. 1986). Failure by the
plaintiff to show a right to rely on the defendant's misrepresentations can defeat the action for
fraud.
52. The court's analysis is fact-driven:
The determination of what constitutes reasonable diligence and prudence must be
made on a case by case basis. Various circumstances which will be considered
include the form and materiality of the representation; the respective age,
experience, intelligence and mental and physical conditions of the parties; and the
relations and respective knowledge and means of knowledge of the parties.
Florentine Corp. v. PEDA I, Inc., 287 S.C. 382, 386, 339 S.E.2d 112, 114 (citing Parks v.
Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129 (1965)).
53. Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 182, 14 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1941).
54. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 250 (1968).
55. 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845 (1924).
56. Id. at 234-35, 123 S.E. at 848; see also F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 283-85 (1990) (discussing the right to rely in South Carolina
jurisprudence and stating that "South Carolina is in accord with the general rule that the victim
has a right to rely so long as he is not reckless or grossly negligent").
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fraudulent representation of the adversary, should not on principle debar the
negligent party from asserting a right to relief on the ground of fraud."5 7
Subsequently, explaining the policy for this doctrine, the South Carolina
Supreme Court stated "that a wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability
by asking the law to condemn the credulity of the ignorant and unwary."Is
Since first establishing the standard to which a fraud victim is held, the
South Carolina appellate courts have revisited the issue numerous times.59
In older cases, the court restated the J.B. Colt standard that only the victim's
recklessness or gross negligence will bar recovery.6' More recently, the
court has stated simply that the representee must use reasonable prudence and
diligence under the Circumstances without articulating whether mere negligence
or recklessness would defeat the victim's right to rely. 61 In some cases the
court implied that mere negligence will bar the plaintiff's recovery.6'
Although it is not stated explicitly, the majority in Nine may have applied
a mere negligence standard, rather than a recklessness or gross negligence
standard, to bar Nine's recovery. The facts present a strong argument for this
conclusion. Henderson made a positive representation to Nine that the house
would receive a clean bill of health from Terminix if certain minor repairs
were made.63 Henderson did not surrender the wood infestation reports
57. J.B. Colt, 129 S.C. at 234, 123 S.E. at 848.
58. Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 182, 14 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1941).
59. The issue of a plaintiff's right to rely commonly arises when a plaintiff seeks to avoid a
contract signed before read. The failure of an educated, literate person to read a contract is per
se reckless unless no meaningful opportunity to read exists or other extenuating circumstances
exist. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 56, at 285-86 & nn.73-75.
60. See Reid v. George Washington Life Ins. Co., 234 S.C. 599, 602, 109 S.E.2d 577, 579
(1959); Tallevast v. Herzog, 225 S.C. 563, 570, 83 S.E.2d 204, 207 (1954); Shumpert v.
Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 401, 412, 68 S.E.2d 340, 345 (1951); O'Connor v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 217 S.C. 442, 448, 60 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1950); Thomas, 197
S.C. at 182, 14 S.E.2d at 888; Souba v. Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 311, 319-20, 197 S.E. 826, 829
(1938); Hood v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 173 S.C. 139, 145, 147, 175 S.E. 76, 79 (1934);
Scott v. Newell, 146 S.C. 385, 408, 144 S.E. 82, 90 (1928).
61. See Florentine Corp. v. PEDA 1, Inc., 287 S.C. 382, 386, 339 S.E.2d 112, 114 (1985);
Gilbert v. Mid-South Mach. Co., 267 S.C. 211, 220, 227 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1976); Parks v.
Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 466-67, 141 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1965); Elders v. Parker, 286
S.C. 228, 233, 332 S.E.2d 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1985); Reid v. Harbison Dev. Corp., 285 S.C.
557, 561, 330 S.E.2d 532, 535 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Bostick v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
806 F.2d 504, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (interpreting South Carolina law).
62. See Aaron v. Hampton Motors, 240 S.C. 26, 34, 124 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1962) (citing
Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 490, 109 S.E.2d 5, 12) (1959) (stating that "one will not be
heard to say that he was deceived by a vendor's misrepresentations if, by his own negligent
failure to avail himself of information easily within his reach, he has contributed to the
perpetration of the alleged fraud"); Weatherford v. Home Fin. Co., 225 S.C. 313, 319, 82
S.E.2d 196, 199 (1954) (per curiam) (standing that "it could not be held as a matter of law that
respondent here, under all the circumstances, was guilty of negligence or carelessness in his
reliance upon the representations upon which the action is founded").
63. Nine v. Henderson, _ S.C. , _, 437 S.E.2d 182, 187 (Ct. App. 1993) (Cureton,
13
Baxley et al.: Tort Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
TORT LAW
disclosing the damage until closing.' These reports often are a morass of
incomprehensible documents to the unwitting residential home purchaser.
Furthermore, the dissent commented that the evidence reflected that the closing
was rushed' and that the reports were difficult to read, not easily compre-
hended by a layman.6" In affirming the trial court's decision on a summary
judgment motion, it seems unlikely that the majority believed that Nine's
conduct was reckless as a matter of law. Therefore, the majority may have
denied recovery to Nine based on his merely negligent behavior.
In affirming, the majority held that no reasonable juror could have found
that Nine had a right to rely on Henderson's representations concerning the
termite. Through omission, the majority calls into question the appropriate
standard to which plaintiffs are held to assert their right to rely. The facts of
Nine indicate that the majority may have denied recovery because of Nine's
negligence. If so, this result contradicts the South Carolina rule that only the
victim's recklessness or gross negligence will bar recovery.
C. Jones DuBose, Jr.
III. COURT REJECTS FIXED LOCALITY RULE FOR NURSES,
ADOPTS NATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE
McMillan v. Durant1 addresses whether a physician expert witness should
provide opinions as to the appropriate nursing standard of care in a negligence
action and whether South Carolina should abandon the fixed locality rule as
the appropriate standard of care for a hospital's nursing staff.2 The South
Carolina Supreme Court adopted a national standard of care for physicians in
King v. Williams,3 and in McMillan it extended the national standard of care
to nurses and other health care professionals.4
As guardians ad litem, the McMillans sought damages for permanent
brain damage to their son when his shunt5 malfunctioned. 6 Joseph McMillan
J., dissenting).
64. Id. at__, 437 S.E.2d at 183.
65. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 187 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at __ n.1, 437 S.E.2d at 185 n.1 (Cureton, J., dissenting).
1. _ S.C. __, 439 S.E.2d 829 (1993).
2. Id. at_, 439 S.E.2d at 831.
3. 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981).
4. See McMillan, __ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 833.
5. "A shunt is a drain inserted into the brain, with a tube running to the abdominal cavity.
The shunt allows excess fluid around the brain to drain into the abdominal cavity which prevents
excess pressure on the brain. This excess pressure on the brain results in brain damage. ..
Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 830 n.1.
6. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 829-31.
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was born prematurely and, as a result of his premature birth, "suffered
intracranial bleeding which required the insertion of a shunt to relieve pressure
and prevent brain damage." 7 Since the insertion of Joseph's shunt, a
neurosurgeon had to revise the shunt three times.8
Eighteen months after birth, Joseph became ill. Three days later his
family pediatrician treated him. The pediatrician diagnosed Joseph as
suffering from an ear infection and an upper respiratory tract infection.
Shortly thereafter, Joseph's condition deteriorated. The shunt was tested, and
it was not the cause of his illness. Joseph was suffering from an inflammation
of his stomach and intestines. Upon recommendation of the pediatrician,
Joseph was admitted to Tuomey Hospital for intravenous hydration.9
It is unclear whether upon Joseph's admittance someone informed the
hospital staff of Joseph's shunt, although evidence exists that no one did. That
evening a nurse discovered the shunt and informed a supervisor who examined
it and determined that it was functioning properly. Later that evening, Mrs.
McMillan informed a nurse that Joseph was not acting normally; he was
opening and closing his mouth to breath. The nurse determined that Joseph
looked normal, but informed the nursing supervisor. The nursing supervisor
also checked Joseph and determined that he looked normal. A minute or two
later, Joseph stopped breathing.'° Artificial respiration was provided until
Dr. Young, the attending physician, arrived. Dr. Young then called Joseph's
neurosurgeon who advised Dr. Young to tap the shunt and, if he found
elevated intracranial pressure, to drain off the excess fluid until the pressure
returned to normal. The staff drained the shunt twice before Joseph's
intracranial pressure returned to a safe level." Joseph was then transported
to Richland Memorial Hospital where the staff discovered that abdominal
tissue had obstructed the end of the shunt tube, blocking the return of fluid to
the abdominal cavity and causing the elevated pressure. Joseph suffered
permanent brain damage.12
The McMillans filed a complaint against Dr. Durant, Dr. Young, and
Sumter Pediatrics, P.A., all of which settled before trial, and Tuomey
Regional Medical Center, Inc., "alleging negligent failure to promptly and
properly treat Joseph."' 3  At trial, the jury returned a verdict against
Tuomey, the only defendant left, for $734,100. The trial judge imposed the
7. Id. at _ , 439 S.E.2d at 830 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 830.
9. McMillan, _ S.C. _, 439 S.E.2d at 830.
10. Id. at , 439 S.E.2d at 830.
11. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 830-31.
12. Id. at 439 S.E.2d at 831; Final Brief of Appellant at 7.
13. McMillan, __ S.C. at, 439 S.E.2d at 831.
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$200,000 statutory cap. Tuomey appealed, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. 
14
The McMillan court decided first whether the trial court properly allowed
a physician expert to testify as to the appropriate nursing standard of care.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting the physician's testimony. 5 In so holding, the court
cited "the long-established rule that the qualification of. . .an expert falls
largely within the trial judge's discretion. " " In Creed a general practitioner
testified as an expert witness as to emotional damages of a tort victim over
objections that the expert was not a neurologist or psychologist. 7 The court
held, "A physician is not incompetent to testify merely because he is not a
specialist in the particular branch of his profession involved. The fact that he
is not a specialist goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. "18
In McMillan the court noted that although a physician may be an expert in one
field, that does not make him an expert in another. 9 The court stated, "In
Botehlo, the orthopedic expert's lack of knowledge in the area of podiatry was
fatal to the admissibility of his testimony."'
In McMillan the court found that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting the physician's expert testimony as to the nursing
standard of care. The court stated, "The expert physician was thoroughly
examined as to his credentials and background, which included his professional
interaction with a multitude of various nursing staffs and his teaching nursing
courses .. .."' The court then concluded, "The fact that the expert was a
physician and not a nurse would merely go to the weight of his testimony, not
to its admissibility."' In distinguishing Botehlo, the court stated, "As a
teacher in the field of nursing, the neurosurgeon here, unlike the orthopedist
in Botehlo, was amply qualified to render an opinion in the field of nurs-
ing."23
The second issue addressed McMillan was whether "the trial court erred
in not charging the 'locality rule' to define the appropriate standard of nursing
14. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 831, 833.
15. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 831-32.
16. Id. at 439 S.E.2d at 831 (citing State v. Schumpert, _S.C. _ , 435 S.E.2d 859
(1993) (applying Creed v. City of Columbia, _ S.C. _ , 426 S.E.2d 785 (1993), for the
same proposition in a civil action)).
17. Creed, - S.C. at _ , 426 S.E.2d at 786.
18. Id. at _ , 426 S.E.2d at 786 (citation omitted).
19. McMillan, - S.C. at__, 439 S.E.2d at 832 (citing Botehlo v. Byoura, 282 S.C. 578,
320 S.E.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1984)).
20. Id. at , 439 S.E.2d at 832.
21. Id. at ,439 S.E.2d at 832.
22. Id. at , 439 S.E.2d at 832.
23. Id. at , 439 S.E.2d at 832.
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care in a medical malpractice action."24 In King' the court adopted a
national standard of care for physicians and dentists in South Carolina. In so
holding, the court reasoned, "the 'locality' rule has been criticized also for
creating practical difficulties, including a scarcity of local physicians willing
to testify on the plaintiffs' behalf, and permitting a local standard of care
below that which patients are entitled to expect."26 Furthermore, the
McMillan court found that Tuomey based its arguments for maintaining a local
standard for hospitals and nurses on arguments similar to those advanced for
maintaining the local standard for physicians. These arguments included
disparate educational requirements and regional limits on training.27
The court recognized that, like nurses, physicians have varying education-
al levels and varying quality of training. However, the court asserted that
under a national standard of care, "the appropriate comparative analysis must
consider the physician by specialty, educational level, medical environment,
and any factor which is relevant to sound medical practice."2" The court also
stated that "the evolution of the law appears to support the adoption of a
national standard of care throughout the health care system."29 To support
its position, the court cited the Colorado Court of Appeals which "held that
since the practice of nursing 'is a highly regulated profession in this state, .
the applicable standard of care is that of the reasonable professional...
This minimum standard is not affected by standards which may be adopted
by various hospitals.'"3 The court also cited a California case in support of
extending the national standard to nurses.3' In Fraio v. Hartland Hospital2
the California Court of Appeals stated, "While nurses traditionally have
followed the instructions of attendant physicians, doctors realistically have long
relied on nurses to exercise independent judgment in many situations. ""
Therefore, the McMillan court extended the national standard to all health care
professionals because the same policy reasons that applied to physicians also
applied to other health care professionals. Finally, the supreme court noted
that applying the national standard will not abolish the effects of the fixed
24. McMillan, - S.C. at _ , 439 S.E.2d at 832.
25. 276. S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981).
26. King, 276 S.C. at 481-82, 279 S.E.2d at 620 (citing David D. Armstrong, Comment,
Medical Malpractice - The "Locality Rule" and the "Conspiracy of Silence, " 22 S.C. L. Ray.
810 (1970)).
27. McMillan, __ S.C. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 832.
28. Id. at 439 S.E.2d at 832.
29. Id. at __,439 S.E.2d at 832.
30. Id. at _ , 439 S.E.2d 832-33 (alteration in original) (quoting Wood v. Rowland, 592
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Colo. Ct. App.'1978)).
31. See McMillan, - S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 833.
32. 160 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
33. Id. at 252.
[Vol. 46
17
Baxley et al.: Tort Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
TORT LAW
locality rule because the national standard of care will use locality as one
factor in its comparative analysis."
In expanding King to nurses, the supreme court followed a national trend
that has been gaining momentum since the 1960s, a decade that started a
dramatic expansion of tort liability.35 This era of expansion peaked in the
early 1980s"6 when the court decided King. Now that the waters have
settled, it is helpful to examine the reasoning behind the trends that developed
during that period of "exuberant excesses."17
One such trend was the restriction or abolition of the fixed locality rule.
The McMillan court abandoned the use of the fixed locality rule as to nurses
and all other health care professionals, replacing it with a national standard of
care, which merely treats locality as one factor in applying the standard of
care. Some courts have abolished the locality rule in its entirety,38 while
other courts have abolished it as to specialists.3 9
As to a physician's standard of care, "there are minimum requirements
of skill and knowledge, which anyone who holds himself out as competent to
treat human ailments is required to have."40 A fixed locality rule "held that
allowance must be made for the type of community in which a physician
carries on his practice, and for the fact.., that a country doctor could not be
expected to have the equipment, facilities, libraries, contacts, opportunities for
learning, or experience afforded by large cities." 4 ' While "[s]ome courts
still follow a strict 'same' locality rule,"42 other courts have expanded the
rule to include "'similar localities,' thus including other towns of the same
general type. 
"41
34. See McMillan, - S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 832.
35. See David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703 (1992) (analyzing the expansion
of tort liability in the 1960s and its marked decrease in the early 1980s).
36. Id. at 708. According to Professor Owen, tort expansion peaked in 1982 with Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), which adopted a true strict liability
doctrine or no-fault doctrine. See Owen, supra note 35, at 714-15.
37. Owen, supra note 35, at 704.
38. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 187-88
(5th ed. 1984); James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modem Status of "Locality Rule" in
Malpractice Action Against Physician Who is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3d 1133 (1980)
(analyzing the current status of the locality rule).
39. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical
Specialist as Determined by Local, "Like Community, " State, National, or Other Standards, 18
A.L.R.4th 603 (1982) (analyzing the status of the locality rule as applied to specialists).
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, § 32, at 187 (citing Kelly v. Carroll, 219 P.2d 79
(Wash.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, 20 N.W.2d 108 (Wis.
1945)).
41. Id. § 32, at 187-88.
42. Id. § 32, at 188 n.4 (citing Stanely v. Fisher, 417 N.E.2d 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).
43. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Finally, several states have adopted yet another compromise between the
national standard of care and a fixed locality rule in applying the standard of
care to specialists. These states have expanded the scope of the community
to include the entire state.'
That many states have not adopted the national standard of care even for
specialists further supports the arguments against the adoption of national
standard of care for nurses. The modifications to the fixed locality rule as
applied to physicians seem to address the major criticisms of the rule, such as
difficulty in finding physicians in the same locality to testify against one
another and allowing substandard levels of care.45 Yet, as courts cure the
problems with the fixed locality rule by slightly varying the rule as applied to
physicians, the problems with the rule may not be as apparent when applied
to nurses and other health care professionals.
The McMillan court gave several reasons for abolishing the fixed locality
rule for doctors in favor of a national standard of care, and it found those
reasons equally applicable to the nursing profession. The first such reason is
"the scarcity of local physicians who would be willing to testify against a
peer. "46 However, this conspiracy of silence argument does not appear to
apply equally to nurses. Because doctors often supply the expert testimony as
to the appropriate standard of care of nurses,47 the scarcity of experts
argument is not as strong. Moreover, although the two professions often work
side by side, no evidence exists that the same conspiracy of silence exists
within the nursing profession between doctors and nurses. Although the court
stated that "present day nursing professionals may also have a certain
reluctance to testify against a local peer," 4 it cited no authority for the
proposition that plaintiffs have difficulty finding expert witnesses to testify
against other nurses.
The second reason the court gave for abandoning the fixed locality rule
was that it "allowed for a local standard of care below what a patient was
entitled to expect."" 9 However, applying this reason to all health care
professionals, the court overlooked a compromise that many courts have
adopted. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court distinguishes between the
standard of care owed by a specialist and that owed by a general practitioner.
In Jordan v. Bogner50 the court. stated, "A nonspecialist physician must act
44. See Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1099 (D. Conn. 1984); Vasquez v.
Markin, 731 P.2d 510, 517 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Zitter, supra note 39, § 5.
45. See MeMillan v. Durant, _ S.C. __, , 439 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1993).
46. Id. at _ , 439 S.E.2d at 833 (citing King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618
(1981)).
47. See, e.g., id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 832.
48. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 832.
49. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 833 (citing King, 276 S.C. at 478, 279 S.E.2d at 618).
50. 844 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
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consistently with the standards required of the medical profession in the
community where he or she practices . .. On the other hand, a specialist
physician's performance is not measured against other physicians in the same
or similar locality."s Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that
courts should hold specialists to a national standard of care because they hold
themselves out as being trained specially. Conversely, general practitioners
do not hold themselves out as specialists, and they may not work in large
hospitals with access to specialized training, equipment, and information.
Therefore, the patient should not expect the same standard of care from a
general practitioner as from a specialist.
Applying the patient expectation argument to nurses suggests the propriety
of the fixed locality rule as the standard of care. The argument that the
standard of care a patient expects does not depend on the health care deliverer
"ignores the economic realities of our health care system and is unfair to
practitioners." 52 Moreover, "[s]ociety has limited resources to expend on
health care; use of nurses in expanded roles helps to allocate those resources
so that patients in low-risk situations can receive less expensive health
care."" Because the training and education of nurses vary dramatically, as
does their level of responsibility,54 it is reasonable that the patient should
expect from nurses a standard of care commensurate with that practiced by
other nurses in a similar locality.
A third reason that the court abandoned the fixed locality rule for nurses
was that " [the old concerns for regional limits on training and lack of
exposure to multi-regional practice for physicians is equally outdated for
nurses. " ' However, this argument cannot apply equally to nurses because
they do not have the standardized training that physicians do and because they
have varying responsibility levels dictated by physicians. Specifically, a
prospective nurse may take three different avenues: baccalaureate, 56
diploma,57 and associate degree programs.5" Although these programs can
51. Id. at 666 (citations omitted); see also Gittens v. Christian, 600 F. Supp. 146, 148-49
(D.V.I. 1985) (finding a family practice specialist owes a higher degree of care than a general
practitioner), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1986).
52. Elizabeth J. Armstrong, Note, Nurse Malpractice in North Carolina: The Standard of
Care, 65 N.C. L. REv. 579, 593 (1987).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 579-80.
55. McMillan v. Durant, _ S.C._, _ , 439 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1993).
56. "In baccalaureateprograms student nurses typically study humanities and science courses
for two years, followed by two or three years of clinical and theoretical instruction in nursing."
Armstrong, supra note 52, at 579 n.2 (Citing COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING, AM.
NURSES' Ass'N, EXAMINING THE VALIDITY OF THE STATE BOARD TEST POOL EXAMINATION
FOR REGISTERED NURSE LICENSURE 7 (1979) [hereinafter COUNCIL]).
57. "Diploma degree programs usually are two or three years long and are conducted by
hospitals." Id. at n.3 (citing COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 7).
58. "Associate degree programs usually require two years and are offered by community or
1994]
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differ by at least two years of education - some focusing on practical aspects,
others on classroom learning - any of these programs suffice to qualify the
nurse to sit for the registered nurse licensing exam.5 9 Conversely, as to
physicians "[s]tate medical practice acts almost uniformly require graduation
from an 'approved' medical school and satisfactory completion of basic science
and medical examinations as conditions of licensure. "6 Additionally,
physicians have residency requirements that provide them with multiregional
exposure, whereas nurses do not.
Finally, this last argument disregards the economic reality that placing
nurses in expanding roles promotes the important goal of low-cost health care.
And, as noted in a University of North Carolina law review article, "Although
nurse specialists' and physicians' functions often overlap, their education and
approach to problems is not identical. ,61
In adopting the national standard of care as to all health care profession-
als, the South Carolina Supreme Court followed a broad national trend that
developed in the 1960s and 1970s. In McMillan, the court applied the same
reasons for abandoning the fixed locality rule for nurses as it did in abandon-
ing application of the rule to physicians. In so doing, the court disregarded
many vital distinctions between the two health care providers that would not
justify application of the same standard of care. Moreover, important policy
reasons, such as the ability to provide low cost health care, apply particularly
to nurses. While in certain circumstances there may be little practical effect
of abandoning the fixed locality rule in favor of the national standard of care,
there are important distinctions, especially when the national standard is
applied to nurses.
Victoria L. Miller
IV. LANDLORDS HAVE No AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
To PROTECT TENANTS FROM CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
In Cramer v. Balcor Property Management' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held, "Neither common law nor the South Carolina Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act, imposes a duty on a landlord to provide protection to
tenants against criminal activity of third parties. "2 The ruling states South
junior colleges." Id. at n.4 (citing COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 7).
59. See id. at 580 n.7 (citing COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 6).
60. Philip C. Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse PractitionerLaws: A Study of Health
Law Refonn, 24 KAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1975) (footnote omitted).
61. Armstrong, supra note 52, at 593.
1. - S.C. _, 441 S.E.2d 317 (1994).
2. Id. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 319.
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Carolina's refusal to derive from the common law an affirmative duty for a
landlord to protect the landlord's tenants from criminal conduct.
Genevieve Zitricki was slain in her apartment in April 1990. An
unknown third party pried open a sliding glass patio door and entered her
apartment. The victim's personal representative instituted a wrongful death
action against her landlord in the United States District Court.3 After the
landlord moved for summary judgment, the district court certified to the South
Carolina Supreme Cour the question of whether "a landlord owe[s] a duty
to a tenant to provide security in and around a leased premises so as to protect
the tenant from criminal activity of third parties?"5
Before the state court, the victim's personal representative attempted to
analogize the landlord-tenant relationship to the innkeeper-guest and store-
owner-invitee relationships.6 South Carolina has shown a willingness to
impose a duty upon storeowners7 and innkeepers' to protect their customers
and guests from foreseeable criminal acts by third parties. The court,-
however, rejected these analogies. 9  In reaching its decision the South
Carolina Supreme Court relied heavily on an earlier district court decision,
Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp.10 The South Carolina Supreme Court
3. Id. at __, 441 S.E.2d at 317.
4. Id. at __, 441 S.E.2d at 317. At its discretion, the South Carolina Supreme Court may
answer questions certified to it by any federal court. S.C. APP. CT. R. 228.
5. Cramer, __ S.C. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 317. A second question asked the source and
circumstances giving rise to a duty identified in response to the first question. Id. at _, 441
S.E.2d at 317.
6. Id. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 318.
7. See Bullard v. Ehrhardt, 283 S.C. 557, 559, 324 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1984) (holding that a
storeowner has a duty to take reasonable care to protect its invitees and that the duty extends to
protection from criminal acts by third parties only if the storeowner knew or had reason to know
of the criminal attack); Munn v. Hardee's Food Sys., 274 S.C. 529, 531, 266 S.E.2d 414, 414
(1980) (per curiam) (recognizing that a storeowner generally does not have a duty to protect its
customers from criminal acts unless the storeowner knows or has reason to know the acts are
occurring or about to occur) (citing Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479,
238 S.E.2d 167 (1977)); Shipes, 269 S.C. at 483-85, 238 S.E.2d at 168-69 (holding that a
storeowner does not have a duty to protect its customers from third party criminal acts unless the
store owner knows or has reason to know the acts are occurring or about to occur) (citing
Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975)). While the trend in the above cases has
been to impose upon the storeowner a duty to protect its customers from foreseeable criminal acts
by third parties, the court has narrowly defined foreseeable. In each of these cases, the court did
not impose the duty upon the store owner because the criminal acts were not sufficiently
foreseeable. See Bullard, 283 S.C. at 62, 324 S.E.2d at 559; Munn, 274 S.C. at 531, 266
S.E.2d at 415; Shipes, 269 S.C. at 485, 238 S.E.2d at 169.
8. See Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (D.S.C. 1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 50 (4th
Cir. 1984); Daniel v. Days Inn, Inc., 292 S.C. 291, 296, 356 S.E.2d 129, 132 (Ct. App. 1987)
(citing Courtney, 566 F. Supp. at 1225).
9. See Cramer, S.C. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 318.
10. 741 F. Supp. 1205 (D.S.C. 1990); see Cramer, _ S.C. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 318.
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noted favorably that the district court in Cooke found the analogies "unpersua-
sive 'in light of the cautious approach South Carolina appellate courts have
taken even in those contexts. ' "" The state court held that the landlord-tenant
relationship differs fundamentally from the storeowner-invitee and innkeeper-
guest relationships. Therefore, the court refused to find that landlords owe an
affirmative common law duty to protect their tenants from criminal activity by
reason of that relationship.' 2 The victim's personal representative conceded
that the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 3 (SCRLTA) did
not impose a duty on the landlord to protect tenants from criminal acts by third
parties. The court concurred that the SCRLTA did not impose such a duty. 4
The court's discussion and ruling generally were conclusory. In deciding
that the landlord-tenant relationship fundamentally differs from the storeowner-
invitee and innkeeper-guest relationships, the court cited Cooke, which quoted
Feld v. Merriam.15 In Feld, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed the
landlord/tenant relationship:
An apartment building is not a place of public resort where one who
profits from the very public it invites must bear what losses that public
might create. It is of its nature private and only for those specifically
invited. The criminal can be expected anywhere, any time, and has been
a risk of life for a long time.16
The Feld court, and by inference the Cooke and Cramer courts, viewed
the lease as a traditional conveyance of a property interest. This view is by
no means universally accepted. The majority of jurisdictions find no duty in
the landlord to protect tenants from third party criminal acts arising from the
mere existence of the landlord-tenant relationship. Generally, the landlord
does not insure the safety of his tenants against third party criminal acts.17
However, some courts have found that this duty may arise from the circum-
stances of a particular case.'" Courts that have found a duty have relied on
11. Cramer, _ S.C. at __, 441 S.E.2d at 318 (quoting Cooke, 791 F. Supp. at 1213).
12. Id. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 318-19.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1993).
14. Cramer, S.C. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 319.
15. 485 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1984); see Cramer, _ S.C. at _, 441 S.E.2d at 318. In Feld the
tenants were abducted from their apartment complex's guarded parking garage and later assaulted.
Feld, 485 A.2d at 744.
16. Feld, 485 A.2d at 745-46.
17. Cookev. Allstate ManagementCorp., 741 F. Supp. 1205,1209 n.1 (D.S.C. 1990) (citing
Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect TenantAgainst CriminalActivities
of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972)).
18. See Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against
CriminalActivities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3D 331 (1972 & Supp. 1993).
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contract law, statutory law, or tort law.19 A plaintiff seeking to impose
liability on a landlord for damages arising from the criminal acts of third
parties should examine each of these potential causes of action.
In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. ,1 the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals applied the contract view of the landlord-tenant
relationship as it applies to modem apartment dwellers.2' In Kline the court
stated:
[Tjhe value of the lease to the modem apartment dweller is that it gives
him a "well known package of goods and services .... It does not give
him the land itself, and to the tenant as a practical matter this is supremely
unimportant .... [Tihe trend toward treating leases as contracts is wise
and well considered.2
In some instances, courts have imposed a duty on landlords due to breach
of a contractual obligation, either implied or express. In Kline, the court
found an implied covenant to maintain security at the level in existence when
the tenant signed the lease233
While it is unlikely that South Carolina courts will imply such a
contractual covenant after the Cramer decision, an express agreement to
provide protective services still might expose a landlord to liability. In
Thompson v. Cane Gardens Apartments,24 the Louisiana Court of Appeals
held that a landlord who makes express or implied promises to provide
security may be liable if the landlord breaches that obligation, and the breach
proximately causes a crime committed by a third party.' Courts do not
define when a mere failure of security will lead to liability. In Feld the court
held that a landlord has no general duty to protect tenants from criminal acts,
but may incur a duty by providing security to attract or keep tenants.26
19. See id.
20. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
21. See id. at 481-82.
22. Id. (quoting Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)).
23. See 439 F.2d at 485-86. The court reached this decision in two steps. First, the landlord
had an obligation to provide those protective services within the landlord's reasonable capacity.
Second, the applicable standard was that level of protection in existence when the tenant signed
the lease. 1d. at 485. In Kline, the landlord drastically reduced the level of protection while the
crime rate on and surrounding the premises increased. See id. at 487.
24. 442 So. 2d 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
25. 1d. at 1298. The plaintiffs alleged that the landlord assured them that the premises were
safe and that the landlord would provide adequate security to make the property safe for older
tenants. Someone who broke into their apartment assaulted the plaintiffs. 1d. at 1297-98.
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Courts largely reject contractual claims arising under implied warranties
of quiet enjoyment and habitability.' In Young v. Morrisey/8 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that no implied warranty of habitability or of
fitness exists in a lease.29 The court decided Young before the enactment of
the SCRLTA in 1986, but the court has not interpreted the SCRLTA as
creating any statutory covenant.
In Cramer the plaintiff conceded no statutory duty existed, and the court
concurred.30 However, in Cooke the court analyzed the plaintiff's claim that
the SCRLTA imposed on landlords a statutory duty to protect tenants from
criminal acts.3" The plaintiff relied on an SCRLTA provision requiring the
landlord to "put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.
32
The plaintiff contended that maintaining the premises in a fit and habitable
condition pertained not only to the property's physical conditions, but also
required the landlord to protect the tenant from criminal assault. The court
did not agree, finding the provision imposed only a duty to protect the tenant
from injuries caused by "'failures of the building.'" 33  Generally, courts
agree with the Cooke holding that a "safe and habitable" clause does not
impose on the landlord a duty to do more than maintain the physical condition
of the premises.
34
This general consensus will not preclude a court's finding that a violation
of a specific statute may lead to landlord liability for harm proximately caused
by that violation. In Paterson v. Deeb5 the Florida District Court of
Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing a suit against a landlord
27. See generally Spivey, supra note 18, § 6[b] (providing summaries of cases generally
dismissing claims arising under these warranties).
28. 285 S.C. 236, 329 S.E.2d 426 (1985).
29. Id. at 241, 329 S.E.2d at 429.
30. Cramer v. Balcor Property Management, Inc., - S.C. _, _, 441 S.E.2d 317, 319
(1994).
31. See Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (D.S.C. 1990).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(a) (2) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
33. Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1208 (quoting Deem v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc., 799
F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1986)). In Deem, the court reviewed a Virginia statute requiring a
landlord to maintain common areas in a clean and safe condition. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-248.13(a) (3) (Michie 1914). The circuit court held that maintaining the premises in a safe
condition did not extend to protecting tenants from criminal activity. See Deem, 799 F.2d at 945-
46.
In Cooke the court stated, "The [SCRLTA] uses the terms 'fit' and 'habitable.' It is an
even greater stretch to construe those terms to include protection against criminal activity than
it was to so construe the word 'safe.'" 741 F. Supp. at 1208.
34. See generally Spivey, supra note 18, § 5[a] (providing a summary of cases analyzing
statutes to maintain safe premises as a basis for a potential duty for landlords to protect tenants
from criminal acts by third parties).
35. 472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 8 (Fla.), and
review denied, 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1986).
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who allegedly violated a statutory duty to provide locks and keys where a third
party raped the tenant." The court recognized that the statute was mandatory
and that violation of the statute would be sufficient to state a cause of action
for negligence."
Courts imposing tort liability generally find negligent performance of
some act or impose on landlords a duty to protectO tenants from foreseeable
risks or harm." A landlord who increases the risk of a tenant's loss from
criminal acts must exercise due care to minimize the risks to tenants arising
from the landlord's actions.3 9 In Cooke the only claim to survive the
defendant's motion for summary judgment was that the defendant negligently
stored a ladder that, according to the plaintiff, a third party used to break into
the plaintiff's apartment.4" Intuitively, this reasoning would apply to a
landlord who negligently repairs or unreasonably fails to repair doors,
windows, or locks.
The duty, found by some courts, that a landlord must protect tenants from
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties is more problematic.
Generally, these cases are fact-specific. Liability may depend on whether the
criminal act occurs in the apartment or in a common area.4'
The real problem is defining foreseeability. It is possible to find case law
supporting almost any position. The specific facts required to make criminal
acts reasonably foreseeable cover a wide spectrum.
At one extreme, in Johnston v. Harris42 the court held that because the
building was in a high crime district, the landlord could foresee that the failure
to lock and adequately light the buildings vestibule could lead to criminal acts
against tenants.43
36. See id. at 1213-14, 1220. In Paterson, a tort suit, the court refused to rule on whether
the case also stated a cause of action in contract. Id. at 1214 n.1.
37. See id. at 1218.
38. See generally, Spivey, supra note 18, §§ 7-9 (summarizing cases examining a landlord's
duty under tort law to protect tenants from third party criminal acts).
39. Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.S.C. 1990) (citing
Spivey, supra note 18, § 7[b]).
40. See id. at 1210. The court noted that it did not impose an affirmative general duty on the
landlord, but that it applied the general negligence standard that there is a duty to perform all acts
with due care. See id. at 1210 n.2.
41. See Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F. Supp. 477, 480-81
(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("In this jurisdiction, certain duties have been assigned to the landlord because
of his control of common [areas]. ...
[The landlord] is the only party who has the power to make the necessary repairs or to
provide the necessary protection.").
42. 198 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 1972).
43. Id. at 410-11.
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In Czerwinski v. Sunrise Point Condominium," the court ruled that the
trial court erred in holding that the attack on the plaintiff was unforeseeable.
The condominium had a five-year history of crimes against persons and
property on its premises.45
However, in Shepard v. Drucker & Falk,46 the court held that four
crimes on the premises involving passkeys were irrelevant to the foreseeability
of the plaintiff's rape in the complex's parking lot. Additionally, evidence of
a rape at another complex managed by the defendants was similarly irrele-
vant.47
At the other end of this spectrum is Cramer in which the court held there
is no duty, regardless of the foreseeability of criminal acts by third parties.
Thus, a court that wants to impose a duty on landlords to protect tenants
from third party crime can easily find a theory to support its action. The
South Carolina Supreme Court was not so inclined. The facts the court faced
made the Cramer decision inevitable.
The court previously rejected any contract claim due to an implied
warranty of habitability.4s Similarly, the court found no duty imposed by the
fit and habitable provision of the SCRLTA.49 The only option that the court
realistically had was to impose a duty to protect tenants from reasonably
foreseeable third-party criminal acts.
Given the court's narrow interpretation of reasonable foreseeability, 0 the
court probably would impose this duty only in response to facts that strongly
imply the criminal acts were in fact foreseeable. In Cramer, the appellant
alleged no facts leading to the conclusion that the attack on Zitricki was
reasonably foreseeable by the landlord." In the future, a case whose facts
strongly support that the criminal acts are indeed reasonably foreseeable may
cause the court to revisit this issue.
Timothy J. O'Rourke
44. 540 So. 2d 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 201.
46. 306 S.E.2d 199 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
47. Id. at 202.
48. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 7-8.
51. Brief of Appellant at 2-3.
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